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Administrative Regulation of the High School Press
You are a high school student with a complaint about the election
procedures for student government. You know the student newspaper
refuses to print such controversial material, so you decide to distribute
a handbill in the halls. But first, ever prudent, you check your copy of
the Code of Student Regulations.- Buried amidst the fine print is the
following section:
No person shall distribute any printed or written matter on the grounds
of any school or in any school building unless the distribution of such
material shall have prior approval by the school administration. In
granting or denying approval, the following guidelines shall apply. No
material shall be distributed which, either by its content or by the manner of distribution itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly operation and discipline of the school, will cause violence or disorder, or will
constitute an invasion of the rights of others. 1

The regulation mandates swift review of material submitted for approval and permits appeal to the Board of Education. Another section
of the regulations authorizes the school administration to suspend students who violate the rules.
You read the regulation with dismay. The criteria look vague
enough to justify denying approval to almost anything, and the only
appeal is to the principal's bosses. But without prior administrative
approval you could be suspended for making your point. Finally you
submit your handbill to the principal for review; he denies permission
to distribute the handbill on school property, saying that your criticism will undermine authority, hamper discipline, and interfere with
the orderly operation of the school and its elections. The principal
reminds you that you can appeal his decision, but not until the next
monthly meeting of the Board of Education. 2 The election will have
passed by then, so you regretfully tear up your diatribe and resign
yourself to suffering in silence.
This Note examines the constitutional limits on administrative reg.ulation of publications by and for public high school students. 3 Part I
1. This language is quoted from the regulation challenged in Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of
Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1971). Eisner upheld the regulation against challenges for
vagueness and overbreadth, despite reservations about the exact language used. 440 F.2d at 80809.
2. Long delays are tolerated in evaluating the suppression of student speech. Compare
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding suppression ofa student-compiled
sexual-attitudes questionnaire until after a 12-week administrative appeals process), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 925 (1978), with New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting
government claim of irreparable damage to national security as insufficient to justify a restraint
on publication of classified documents; articles appeared June 12-18, 1971; district court and
court of appeals review completed by June 23; Supreme Court opinion issued on June 30).
3. This Note does not address the right of private schools to regulate student publications. In
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discusses the widely divergent standards adopted by different circuits.
Part II describes the hard line the Supreme Court has taken against
restraints on free expression in the adult context and the different circumstances that justify limiting freedom of expression in high schools.
Part III discusses the timing of administrative regulation of student
speech. This Part argues that prior restraint is constitutionally acceptable and, in fact, preferable to subsequent punishment so long as its
use is governed by proper criteria. Part IV analyzes the justifications
advanced by schools to support the regulation of student publications,
concluding that the Supreme Court's guidelines must be read strictly
to minimize encroachment on students' first amendment rights. Part
V describes the need for judicial review of suppression of student
speech, but concludes that the student should have the burden of challenging the regulation by filing suit.

I.

STATUS OF AUTHORITY

The starting point for any discussion of the first amendment rights
of high school students is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. 4 In Tinker, the Supreme Court for the first time
squarely recognized students' right to freedom of expression in the
schools. 5 The Court, however, went on to add:
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech. 6

Because courts have found a compelling state interest in ensuring orderly schools, they have permitted regulation of some student speech7
that in the adult context would be inviolable. 8
Since promulgating these standards in 1969, the Supreme Court
has refused to apply them to other student speech cases. Five cases
raising the issue of high school students' first amendment rights have
been brought to the Court on petitions for certiorari: four times the
writ has been denied, 9 and the Court dismissed the fifth case as moot
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the actions of a private school that received over 90% of its funds from the state were not covered by the stateaction doctrine, under which the first amendment is applied to the states via the fourteenth
amendment. The opinion emphasized that a state function is one reserved exclusively to the
state, whereas education has traditionally been shared by the public and private sectors.
4. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
5. 393 U.S. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
6. 393 U.S. at 513.
7. See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966).
8. See notes 23-35 infra and accompanying text.
9. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (forbidding school from disciplining students for off-campus distribution of a satire on student life), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
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after learning at oral argument that the plaintiff had graduated from
high school. 10 Each circuit has thus been left to its own interpretation
of the Tinker standard, the result being inconsistency both within a
given circuit11 and among the circuits.
The Seventh Circuit has taken the hardest line against administrative restrictions on the high school press. In reversing the suspension
of students for distributing an unapproved underground newspaper in
school, the court stated: "Tinker . . . is properly a formula for determining when the requirements of school discipline justify punishment
of students for exercise of their First-Amendment rights. It is not a
basis for establishing a system of censorship and licensing designed to
prevent the exercise of First-Amendment rights." 12 However, the
court went on to assert that school officials may establish "reasonable,
specific regulations setting forth the time, manner and place in which
distribution of written materials may occur," 13 and may punish students who violate these rules or who distribute obscene or libelous
literature. 14
The Second Circuit has given high school officials much more
power over the content of student publications. It reads Tinker as permitting prior review of material distributed in schools 15 and defers
(1980); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (permitting school's prohibition of
student-sponsored survey of student sexual attitudes and experiences when school psychologists
feared harm to some students), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Sullivan v. Houston lndep.
School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.) (allowing school to suspend a student for distribution of
unapproved material adjacent to school property - student's failure to comply with prior-submission procedure sufficient for discipline without reaching the constitutionality of the underlying rules), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.)
(enjoining discipline of a student for distribution of unapproved material on school premises
when the discipline was based on the content of the material and not the mode of distribution),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
10. Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973) (preventing school
from forbidding on-campus distribution of an underground newspaper containing vulgar - but
not legally obscene - language), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 929 (1974), vacated as moot, 420 U.S.
128 (1975).
11. Compare Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) (voiding guidelines for
failure to define "substantial disruption"), with Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th
Cir. 1980) (upholding a regulation banning an undefined class of "material which encourages
actions which endanger the health and safety of students"); compare Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972) (a school district's requiring prior approval of student
expression held unconstitutional), with Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("responsible and fair regulations" for prior submission held not always unconstitutional). For a more comprehensive overview of the split in authority, see Huffman & Trauth,
High School Students' Publication Rights and Prior Restraint, 10 J. L. & Eouc. 485 (1981).
12. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972) (emphasis in original).
13. 460 F.2d at 1359. See notes 145-49 infra and accompanying text.
14. 460 F.2d at 1359.
15. In invalidating a school prior-submission rule as procedurally unsound although substantively adequate, the court stated, "We do not agree . . . that reasonable and fair regulations
which . . . required prior submission of material for approval, would in all circumstances be an
unconstitutional 'prior restraint.' " Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir.
1971).
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greatly to the judgment of school authorities in determining what can
be suppressed. 16 Schools in the Second Circuit may decide for themselves what constitutes a disruption, and the courts will not intervene
except in extreme cases: "It is to everyone's advantage that decisions
with respect to the operation of local schools be made by local
officials." 17
The other circuits that have addressed this issue have taken an intermediate position. Most of these cases have arisen in the Fourth
Circuit, which treats administrative prior restraints as presumptively
unconstitutional 18 but has permitted them when the standards to be
applied are clear and understandable, 19 and students are provided a
prompt and adequate appeals procedure. 20 The First, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits have generally accepted the Fourth Circuit's intermediate position, 21 permitting prior submission rules but scrutinizing the
judgment of school officials more closely than does the Second
16. Trachtman v. Anker, 5,63 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[A] federal court ought not to
impose its own views in such matters where there is a rational basis for the decisions and actions
of the school authorities."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
17. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
18. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1973) (invalidating
school prior-submission rule for vagueness, overbreadth, and failure to provide a prompt review
and appeals procedure).
19. In Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1973), the court concluded that a definition including the terms "libelous" and "obscene" was not precise or understandable enough for high school students.
20. In practice, schools have had difficulty establishing standards that meet these criteria.
See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) (rule drafted to comply with these
criteria still held vague for failing to define the Supreme Court's substantial-disorder or materialdisruption test more precisely and for defining "libelous" in a manner inconsistent with the constitutional definition). But in Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980), a case involving efforts to halt distribution after it had begun, the Fourth Circuit upheld a decision prohibiting
continued on-campus distribution of an underground newspaper containing advertisements for
drug paraphernalia under a rule prohibiting "material which encourages actions which endanger
the health and safety of students." 622 F.2d at 1203. This language appears vaguer than Ian·
guage in a prior submission rule previously rejected by the Fourth Circuit. See note 19 supra.
The Williams court noted with approval the limited nature of the restriction: no prior restraint
was involved, the students were given back all confiscated copies the same day and permitted to
distribute the newspaper anywhere except on campus, and no disciplinary action was taken
against the students. 622 F.2d at 1207.
21. Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Writers on a high
school newspaper do not have an unfettered constitutional right to be free from pre-publication
review.") (dictum in suit brought by a teacher who alleged he was fired for permitting the school
newspaper to publish controversial articles); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist. 462 F.2d
960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) ("(E]fforts at expression by high school students may be subjected to
prior screening under clear and reasonable regulations . . . ."); Riseman v. School Comm., 439
F.2d 148, 149 (!st Cir. 1971) (prior restraint held not per se unconstitutional, but regulation
prohibiting distribution of advertising or promotional literature on school property without any
"effort to minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint" held invalid); see also Hernandez v.
Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Neb. 1977) (permitting prior approval only with appropriate
safeguards and invalidating school board rules that ban all commercial speech regardless of potential for disruption).
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Circuit. 22
In sum, the circuits are split on what type of student speech a
school may constitutionally regulate, whether prior restraints on student speech are permissible, and ultimately on what criteria should be
used to determine when administrative regulation of student speech is
constitutionally permissible. The remainder of this Note will discuss
these issues, proposing constitutionally sound criteria and procedures
for the regulation of student speech.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON REsTRAINTS OF SPEECH

Before considering the first amendment rights of high school students, one must first understand the rules governing similar expression
by adults. This Part will examine the Supreme Court's pronouncements on freedom of expression in the adult context and discuss circumstances that may permit greater control over the high school
press.
A. Adult Speech
Few types of regulation have been criticized as sharply as prior
restraints on adult expression. The Supreme Court has declared that
"prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights," 23 and
the Court has never upheld a permanent restraint imposed without a
final legal determination that the expression was unprotected. 24
Under any circumstances, attempts at prior restraint must overcome a
22. See Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1971) (requiring the
school to present facts supporting its fear of substantial disruption).
23. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
24. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (declaring unconstitutional
a state statute authorizing prior restraint of allegedly obscene films without final adjudication of
obscenity); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (voiding order against reporting
details of a notorious murder until jury impaneled to try the accused killer); New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting government claim of irreparable harm to national
security if classified government documents published, as insufficient to justify a restraint on
publication); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (voiding an injunction against distribution of leaflets attacking real estate broker for encouraging whites to move
from a neighborhood); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (preventing a state commission from pressuring distributors not to sell material it deemed harmful to minors); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating state statute allowing injunction against continued
publication of a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper); cf United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.) (granting injunction against publication of details relating
to the construction of nuclear weapons as potentially causing irreparable damage to national
security), reconsidered, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979)
(after the challenged material appeared elsewhere in substantially identical form); Southeastern
Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (overturning municipality's refusal, based on fears of
obscenity, to rent an auditorium for a production of the play Hair as an unlawful prior restraint);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (permitting limited prior restraint pending a judicial
evaluation of allegedly obscene material); but cf Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)
(allowing permanent injunction against distribution of books found at trial to be legally obscene).
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heavy presumption of invalidity. 25
Despite its otherwise rigid stance, the Court has held that certain
narrowly defined classes of speech are not immunized by the first
amendment and may be regulated or proscribed. These classes include
obscene speech26 and speech endangering national security. 27 Other
speech, while not restrainable, may subject the speaker to sanctions.
This category includes malicious defamatory speech28 and incitement
to illegal action. 29 An attempt to enlarge the list to include speech
endangering the right of an accused to a fair trial has been rejected,
and a majority of the Justices in that case suggested that such a restraint may never be constitutional. 30
Even if the speech in question falls under one of these exceptions to
the first amendment, a government entity seeking a restraint must follow proper procedure. For example, the courts will not allow administrative panels to adjudicate cases involving allegedly obscene films,
even temporarily, unless that panel follows procedures "designed to
25. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
26. Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). See note 115 infra and accompanying text. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965),
permits limited prior restraint pending a judicial determination of obscenity, and Kingsley Books
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), permits permanent injunctive relief against books found legally
obscene at trial. Because everything not legally obscene is protected speech, and because the line
is so hazy, Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963), warns that special precautions are
needed to keep the regulations within constitutional bounds.
27. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). This standard has been interpreted as
permitting the prior restraint of information only if "disclosure • . . will surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people," New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring), or if "publication [would) inevitably,
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of n
transport already at sea," New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See also United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis.) (approving restraint on publication of atomic secrets as analogous to publication of troop movements
during wartime), reconsidered, 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979).
28. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964). While allegedly defamatory
statements cannot be enjoined, see, e.g., Oil Conservation Engg. Co. v. Brooks Engg. Co., 52 F.2d
783, 785-86 (6th Cir. 1931); N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (reporting government
request to suppress criticism of prosecutors from published version of court opinion), those injured by the defamatory remark may sue in tort for damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP
TORTS § 568 (1977). Sullivan requires that a public figure seeking damages prove not only that
the allegedly defamatory statement is false, but also that it was made with "actual malice." 376
U.S. at 279-80.
29. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See also note 112 infra and accompanying
text.
30. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). "(T)here is grave doubt in my mind
whether orders with respect to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be justifi·
able." 427 U.S. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring). "[T)here are compelling reasons for not carving out a new exception to the rule against prior censorship of publication." 427 U.S. at 594-95
(Brennan, J., joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment). "I agree that the
judiciary is capable of protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial without enjoining the press
from publishing information in the public domain." 427 U.S. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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obviate the dangers of a censorship system." 31 The reviewing panel
must either approve the work or go to court seeking a restraint. 32 The
panel has the burden of proof in court, 33 and any restraints imposed
by the panel prior to judicial review may last only a "specified brief
period." 34 Strict compliance with these procedural safeguards is necessary to prevent the curtailment of constitutionally protected
expression. 35
The Supreme Court has twice indicated, however, that expression
by adults but directed toward minors may sometimes be regulated
even though the same expression is protected when aimed at adults.
Both cases involved variable standards for obscenity. In Ginsberg v.
New York, 36 decided a year before Tinker, the Court upheld a statute
forbidding the sale of soft-core pornography to minors. While the
magazines were not obscene for adults, 37 the Court held that a state
could legally bar their sale to minors, citing the state's interests in protecting the welfare of minors and in supporting parents' authority to
keep such publications from their children. 38 A decade later, in FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 39 the Court justified banning a vulgar (but not
obscene) George Carlin monologue from the airwaves by referring,
31. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the
exhibitor or distributor. Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger
that he may well be less responsive than a court - part of an independent branch of government - to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.
380 U.S. at 57-58 (footnote omitted). See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68-71 (1963).
32. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
33. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
34. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); see also New York Times
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Bantam
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
35. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). For example, in Southeastern Promotions, the directors of a municipal auditorium condemned the musical Hair as unfit for their stage
without ever viewing a performance or reading a script, relying entirely on second-hand reports
of "obscenity" on stage. 420 U.S. 546, 548 (1975). In Bantam Books, the actions of a review
board whose purpose was to "educate the public concerning . . . [literature] manifestly tending
to the corruption of the youth" induced distributors to recall copies of the bestselling novel
Peyton Place, thus preventing adults as well as children from obtaining the novel. 372 U.S. 58, 59
(1963).
36. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
37. 390 U.S. at 634.
38. 390 U.S. at 639-40. The New York statute followed the contemporary definition of obscenity, but evaluated expression in terms of its suitability for minors. 390 U.S. at 646. See
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963);
Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Obscenity Litigation,
1968 SUP. Cr. REv. 153; cf. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978) (when defining general
community standards of obscenity, juries may not consider children part of the community).
39. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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among other reasons, to children's easy access to radio receivers. 40
Ginsberg has been cited for the proposition that the first amendment
rights of minors are not coextensive with those of adults, thereby allowing regulation in the student context which would not otherwise be
permitted.41

B. Student Speech
Several school systems have tried to justify restriction of student
expression by claiming, Tinker notwithstanding, that th~ first amendment does not apply to student expression on school property. Some
schools have asserted that the school board's ownership of the building and grounds permits it to control what is distributed on school
property or that the school retains absolute control over publications
that receive school funds. The courts have rejected both of these assertions. As the Fourth Circuit stated in a case involving a college
newspaper:
[I]f a college has a student newspaper, its publication cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its editorial comment. This rule
is but a simple extension of the precept that freedom of expression may
not be infringed by denying a privilege. . . .
. . . Censorship of constitutionally protected expression cannot be
imposed by suspending the editors, suppressing circulation, requiring
imprimatur of controversial articles, excising repugnant material, withdrawing financial support, or asserting any other form of censorial oversight based on the institution's power of the purse. 42

Two cases have expressly adopted this analysis in the high school
setting.43
In other cases, school officials have contended that the newspaper
is merely a part of the academic curriculum, subject to regulation in
4-0. 438 U.S. at 749-50. The court referred to the special pervasiveness of broadcasting that
makes avoidance of the language difficult and to broadcasting's access into the home.
41. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1971); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp.
456, 458-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The
Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 477, 491 (1981); Garvey, Children and the
First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 321, 334-35 {1979); Huffman & Trauth, supra note 11, at
486.
42. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (discussing a college president's
attempt to withdraw funding from student newspaper which advocated segregation) (citations
and footnotes omitted); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943) ("The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against
the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education not excepted."); Reineke v. Cobb
County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (school cannot use a shortage of
funds to justify closing a school newspaper when the shortage was caused by the school's improper confiscation of one issue). Of course, Tinker itself specifically protected a form of student
expression on school property - the wearing of armbands to protest the Vietnam war.
43. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), ajfd., 564 F.2d 157
(4th Cir. 1977); Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Cal. 1976)
(school cannot arbitrarily select one of two student newspapers as authorized to solicit advertisements necessary to meet publication expenses).
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the same manner as an English class.44 Courts have treated this claim
as an issue of fact, reviewing the newspaper to determine whether it is
a forum for student expression or a part of the curriculum designed
only to teach the mechanics of writing and publishing. 45 As a forum
for student expression, the noncurricular press in public high schools
enjoys the same first amendment rights as the adult press, except
where limited by Tinker's substantial-disruption and invasion-of-rights
standards46 and Ginsberg's variable obscenity standard.47 Even if the
paper is adjudged part of the curriculum, Tinker recognizes students'
first amendment rights to express their views on subjects covered by
the curriculum so long as they do so in a nondisruptive manner,
notwithstanding the school's authority to select the content of its curriculum. 48 Thus, while the school may control the topics discussed in
a curricular press, it may not limit the viewpoints to be expressed
solely because of disagreement with the content of those views. ·
Schools do have two special concerns which may justify restraint
of student speech under certain circumstances. First, they must maintain the orderly atmosphere necessary for effective education.49 Sec44. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Va.), ajfd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th
Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), ajfd. without opinion, 515
F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This argument
cannot, of course, justify regulation of the unofficial, "underground" student press, which receives no financial support from the school. Cf Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d
1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the claim that a school-sponsored assembly was part of the school
curriculum in striking down disciplinary action against a student for a speech containing sexual
innuendo).
45. See Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 735 (E.D. Va.) (student
newspaper deemed not part of the curriculum despite school's offering a journalism course and
paying most of the paper's expenses), ajfd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Zucker v. Panitz, 299
F. Supp. 102, 103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (student newspaper deemed a forum for student expression
despite a school policy limiting articles to school-related topics). See also Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum: The High School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEO. L.J.
135, 140-49 (1983) (discussing when a public high school has established a public forum for
student expression, and the consequences of creating such a forum).
46. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
48. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
("Defendants are incorrect in stating that constitutional values are not implicated in curricular
decisions."); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Va.) (permitting the student newspaper to publish an article on contraception even though the school board
had recently voted specifically not to include contraception in its proposed sex education course),
ajfd., 564 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
("Social studies surely is part of the curriculum. Under defendants' theory, the petitioners in
Tinker might well not be permitted to wear armbands to protest the Vietnam war since their
symbolic protest dealt with an area of the curriculum."), ajfd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1975). A school has the power to set its curriculum, but where that curriculum is designed only
to teach students the mechanics of writing and editing, curricular control should be limited to
sloppy or ungrammatical expression, not expression dealing with "inappropriate" topics. The
school might be able to limit coverage of a curricular newspaper to certain issues, but it cannot
prescribe the nature of this coverage.
49. Cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (permitting, under limited circumstances,
warrantless searches of students' personal effects by school administrators).
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ond, they should be able to protect themselves from tort liability. If an
official school publication such as a school newspaper contains libelous
material, the school that authorized the publication could be held liable for damages. so Both the American Bar Association and the American Civil Liberties Union have recognized the right of high school
officials to suppress libelous student expression.st
Ill.

THE TIMING OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION

A key question left unanswered by Tinker is whether unprotected
speech can actually be restrained, or whether relief is limited to postpublication punishment. Schools that require prior administrative review of student publications have adopted widely varying protections
for students. 52 Other school districts have tried to avoid the constitutional problems inherent in prior submission by halting distribution of
the offending material after publication53 or by disciplining the students who created the challenged material. 54
SO. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at A26 col. I (commenting on school district's being
found liable for comments in student newspaper). The RE.sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 228 (1958) states that "a principal is liable for the acts of his agent if the agent is acting within
the scope of his duties," and if a school establishes a student newspaper, students who publish
that newspaper are acting within the scope of their authority. See, e.g., Galvin v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford R.R., 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 262 (1960) (employer liable for slander
when its security guard publicly accused plaintiff of theft). Of course, this justification exists only
so long as the students are actually agents of the school. See notes 108·09 infra and accompanying text.
51. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE SECONDARY
SCHOOLS 12 (1971); JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN·
ISfRATION, AMERICAN BAR AssN., STANDARDS RELATING TO SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION 84
(1982) [hereinafter cited as PROJECT]. The ACLU recommends in the college setting that
"(w]herever possible a [college] newspaper should be financially and physically separate from the
college, existing as a legally independent corporation. The college would then be absolved from
legal liability for the publication and bear no direct responsibility to the community for the views
expressed." AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COLLEGE CIVIL
LIBERTIES).
52. Compare Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975) (regulation defining "libel,"
"obscenity," and "distribution"; providing for a two-pupil-day review period with written rea·
sons for denying approval; and establishing a three-day appeal procedure invalidated for not
defining terms and for not ensuring the student a full notice and hearing), with Fujishima v.
Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (regulation requiring prior approval before distri·
bution of any written matter on school property with no guidelines for approval, time limit for
review, or appeal procedures voided as an unconstitutional prior restraint), and Quarterman v.
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971) (similar regulation declared unconstitutional as a standardless
prior restraint).
53. See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980) (approving action of officials who
barred continued on-campus distribution of an underground newspaper containing advertisements for drug paraphernalia).
54. See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d IO (7th Cir.) (overturning expulsion ofa student
for distributing, without approval, an underground newspaper critical of school authorities), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal.
1969) (upholding IO-day suspension and removal from student government offices of students
who distributed a vulgar underground newspaper outside the school gates).

December 1984]

Note -

High School Press

635

The circuits have split on whether prior restraint is constitutionally
permissible. The Seventh Circuit has held that only postpublication
punishment can pass constitutional scrutiny, 55 while the Second,
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have held that prior restraints are constitutionally permissible. 56 The relevant language in Tinker refers to "any
facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities."57 This language implies that school authorities may prohibit expression before any disruption actually occurs, based solely on a
reasonable forecast of disruption. 58 This interpretation of the Tinker
standard allows a system of prior screening so that a school can properly determine which expression is likely to cause disruption.
The Seventh Circuit approach, which limits schools to postpublication relief, neither provides students with increased protection from
arbitrary decisions nor advances the interests of the school. A limitation on the timing of administrative sanction means that a school can
take actiQn only after substantial disruption has occurred. Although
there is a substantial danger of abuse in a system that allows school
officials to prescreen material criticizing them, the same danger exists
when these same officials can impose discipline after publication. A
school official can just as easily impose an arbitrary punishment as an
arbitrary prior restraint. Nor can postpublication sanctions prevent
substantial disruption of the classroom, because they lack the deterrence found in criminal penalties imposed for similar disruption. 59
Postpublication review would be equally ineffective in preventing libel,
for a damage remedy would not deter a high school student lacking
55. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); see notes 12-14 supra and
accompanying text.
56. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Quarterman v.
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971);
see also Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982); Riseman v. School
Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971); notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text.
57. 393 U.S. at 514.
58. See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (school officials may act before
disruption occurs and have a duty to prevent such disruption); Shanley v. Northeast Indep.
School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (school may prohibit expression "if the school
administration can demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that the expression would engender
. . . material and substantial interference"); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1971)
("The school authorities are not required to 'wait until the potential (for disorder) is realized
before acting.'" (citation omitted)); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1970) (school
may outlaw all "message" buttons if it can demonstrate a reasonable fear of disruption from the
wearing of such buttons, even though no disruption has actually resulted), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971).
59. High school students are less mature than adults, and may be more willing to challenge
authority without considering the consequences. Second, and more important, the threat of suspension from school is not a deterrent in the same sense that a criminal penalty is a deterrent.
Depriving someone of liberty is quite different from forbidding him to do something he would
otherwise be required to do, such as attending school. Many students would not regard the
enforced vacation as much of a penalty.
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resources to indemnify the school. 60 Because a policy of prior restraint relies on prevention instead of deterrence, it is more likely to
succeed.
Not only would prior submission of school publications more effectively serve the needs of the school administration, but it would also be
less likely to discourage student speech. Postpublication review can
have a "chilling effect": a student wishing to address a controversial
topic might be unwilling to express herself if she thinks her expression
might subject her to sanctions. This danger is especially acute when
dealing with vague standards such as "substantial disruption," which
provide considerable discretion to the reviewer and offer little guidance to the speaker. A properly functioning system of prior submission, unlike a properly functioning system of subsequent punishment,
would allow school officials to pass on the potential disruptiveness of
student expression before the student risked sanctions, approving the
close cases in advance and thus encouraging the publication of protected expression that comes close to the borderline. 61 The first
amendment problems presented by regulation of student expression
are best solved by proper criteria, clear standards, and close scrutiny
of administrative decisions whenever made, not by limits on the timing
of the decisions.
IV.

CRITERIA FOR REGULATION OF THE STUDENT PRESS

School officials have relied on numerous criteria that they claim
allow them to suppress student expression. The substantial-disruption
and invasion-of-rights tests are derived from Tinker. Regulation of
obscene speech and speech inciting lawless action is permissible under
the same standards applied to speech addressed to adults. In addition,
schools have claimed a variety of justifications not explicit in constitutional guidelines and have asserted a right to control the mode of distribution without regard for the content of the expression. This section
analyzes the justifications and application of regulations limiting student expression and suggests constitutionally sound criteria for regulation of the student press.
A. Substantial Disruption
The first part of the Tinker standard permits school officials to regulate expression that "materially disrupts classwork or involves sub60. Without prior submission, the damage liability of the school is dependent upon the judg·
ment of the newspaper's editorial board - a situation which could lead to stricter supervision,
curtailment, or abolition of sections of the student press. See also notes 92-95 infra and accompa·
nying text.
61. See Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58
B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978).
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stantial disorder." 62 This test is taken from Burnside v. Byars, 63 a
Fifth Circuit case which arrived at the standard by "balancing . . .
First Amendment rights with the duty of the state to further and protect the public school system." 64 The compelling state interest in
maintaining an orderly learning environment was held to justify reasonable regulations to ensure order. 65 Tinker offers no definition of
"material disruption" or "substantial disorder," except to say that
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression.'' 66 Most courts, however, have struck down as vague regulations that merely parrot the
Tinker language: "It does not at all follow that the phrasing of a constitutional standard by which to decide whether a regulation infringes
upon rights protected by the first amendment is sufficiently specific in
a regulation to convey notice to students or people in general of what
is prohibited." 67
One short definition is found in Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School
District, which defines "disruption" to mean "a physical disruption
which constitutes a substantial material threat to the orderly operation
of the campus." 68 This definition would exclude, for instance, a newspaper editorial questioning the need for a new rule (no physical disruption) or an article profiling a controversial topic such as drug abuse
or homosexuality (no physical disruption and no substantial threat to
order). To satisfy the Tinker test, the fear of substantial disruption
must be based on "substantial reliable information," not mere intuition. 69 Additionally, the fear must be that the expression itself will be
62. 393 U.S. at 513 (1969).
63. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), cited in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
64. 363 F.2d at 748.
65. 363 F.2d at 748. In Burnside a Qan on the distribution and wearing of "freedom buttons"
in a Mississippi public school was enjoined as an unreasonable restraint on expression because
the school b9ard could not demonstrate that any disruption had been caused by the buttons. 363
F.2d at 748.
66. 393 U.S. at 508 (1969).
67. Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot,
420 U.S. 128 (1975); accord Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975); Pliscou v.
Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842, 850 (E.D. Cal. 1976). But see Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding a regulation which refers to
"disorder'' (without the modifier) as constitutionally sound, although "greater specificity in the
statement would be highly desirable"). The Eisner court was willing to "assume that the Board
would never contemplate the futile as well as unconstitutional suppression of matter that would
create only an immaterial disturbance." 440 F.2d at 808 (emphasis in original). This assumption
has proved overly optimistic. See, e.g., Balcer v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517
(C.D. Cal. 1969) (student body president suspended for 10 days and stripped of his office for olfcampus distribution of an underground newspaper containing the word "bullshit" in an advertisement, with no showing of disturbance caused by the newspaper).
68. 411 F. Supp. at 850. This definition was talcen from Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.
3d 138, 150, 514 P.2d 697, 704, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897, 904 (1973).
69. Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D.N.H.), vacated and remanded, 502 F.2d
1159 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (school officials
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disruptive, not that those holding contrary views will act disruptively. 70 The harm alleged to result from the expression must be the
likely result of the expression - not necessarily a certain consequence,
but more than a mere possibility. 71
Several cases illustrate this standard. School officials have been
held justified in fearing substantial disruption when, the day after a
widespread student walkout resulting in several suspensions, other students distributed leaflets in the halls calling for another walkout the
next day. 72 Similarly, officials have been permitted to halt distribution
of a student newspaper that contained an inflammatory letter to the
editor after an investigation revealed that it had not been written by its
purported author, because the letter was likely to incite both its purported creator and its ostensible target. 73 The restraints in these cases
were justified because the school officials could point to specific forms
of disruption likely to result from the student expression.
The substantial-disruption standard has been overextended on several occasions when school officials have attempted to restrain offcampus expression or to discipline students for off-campus distribution
of material alleged to violate school standards. 74 One court has upheld sanctions against students for off-campus distribution of an underground newspaper based on reports of classes disrupted by students
reading the paper and the principal's testimony that an "underground
newspaper" would "diminish control and discipline," 75 although the
justified in fearing disruption from the wearing of political buttons, given recent school history of
racial turmoil), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
70. Butts v. Dallas lndep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731-32 (5th Cir. 1971) (wearing of
black armbands to protest Vietnam War held not disruptive, although the administration feared
that war supporters would tear olfthe armbands and create a disturbance). Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951), established a "fighting words" exception to the first amendment, holding
that a speaker whose language creates an imminent danger to public order by inciting others to
attack him may be convicted of disorderly conduct. However, Feiner should not be applied in
the school setting. First, Feiner involves not a prior restraint as in the school setting, but rather a
subsequent sanction. Moreover, because students are less mature than adults, the risk of controversial speech causing a disruption increases, and students are in such close and continued proximity that the disputants will be unable to avoid one another. Applying Feiner would permit
school officials to use the rule "solely as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views," a
use forbidden by Feiner. 340 U.S. at 321.
71. See Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (school officials' fear of disruption
judged reasonable, although no disruption actually resulted from the expression), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971).
72. Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981). The court upheld the suspensions of
the students who produced the leaflets.
73. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The letter, allegedly written by
the lacrosse team, threatened to "kick the greasy ass" of the newspaper editor unless more sports
articles were forthcoming. The editor responded with invective of her own. The court identified
two possible sources of disruption: friction between the team and the editors, and friction between the team and the actual authors of the letter. 463 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
74. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980); Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th .Cir. 1971); Baker v. Downey
City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
75. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 524-25 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The
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principal had only a generalized, undifferentiated fear that his authority would be diminished. But questioning the authority of school officials is often a primary purpose of underground student newspapers,
and any effective criticism may diminish official authority. 76 School
officials may not use their supervising power over students to silence
all views contrary to their own; the substantial-disruption standard
justifies only actions to prevent disruption of classrooms, not an attack
on the newspaper itself. A proper response to the threat of classroom
disruption would have been to confiscate copies read during class.
This less restrictive alternative would permit circulation of the newspaper with no likelihood of classroom disruption. 77
The special power over the student press given to school officials
reflects the officials' duty to preserve order in the schools, not any reduced protection for juvenile speech as such. 78 When the justification
disappears, so does the power. 79 The power to control students' offcampus activities not affecting the orderly operation of the school rests
with the parents and the state, 80 not with school authorities.
B.

Invasion of the Rights of Others

The second part of the Tinker test indicates that student expression
constituting an "invasion of the rights of others" is not protected by
the first amendment. 81 This test is taken from Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Board ofEducation, 82 where students distributing buttons simcourt cited a provision of the school board policy that required students "to maintain high Stan·
dards of personal conduct" and a section of the California Code that required students to "refrain entirely from the use of profane or vulgar language."
76. Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) ("Criticism of . . . official
conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and
hence diminishes . . . official reputations").
77. Cf. Schneider v. State (Town oflrvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating ordinance
forbidding distribution of literature in public places though ordinance had been advanced as
necessary to prevent littering; a less restrictive alternative would be to punish the litterers
directly).
78. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[B]ecause school officials have ventured out of the school yard and into the general community where the freedom
accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind
government officials in the public arena."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); see also Shanley v.
Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to adopt a blanket
rule against punishment for off-campus activities, but suggesting such punishment should be left
to other authorities).
79. If off-campus distribution results in substantial disruption of school activities, then the
school may discipline the distributors under the Tinker standard, but may not restrain the distribution. Any claim of substantial disruption resulting from off-campus distribution must be analyzed closely to determine whether the disruption was actually caused by the distributors or by
those who brought the material onto campus.
80. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980).
81. 393 U.S. at 513.
82. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
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ilar to those protected in Burnside v. Byars 83 did so in part by accosting their peers in the halls and pinning buttons to their clothing. 84
Because the right to express oneself includes the right not to express
the opinions of others, 85 students who pin buttons on unwilling passersby are invading the rights of those individuals and can thus be
stopped. 86
The Second Circuit has grossly distorted the meaning of the invasion-of-rights test. In Trachtman v. Anker, 81 the court held, over a
vigorous dissent, that a student newspaper's distributing to New York
City high school students a questionnaire on sexual attitudes and experiences and then publishing the results would "invade the rights of
other students by subjecting them to psychological pressures which
may engender significant emotional harm." 88 This is precisely the
kind of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance that,
under Tinker, cannot justify any regulation at all, 89 especially when, as
here, the surveys were to be both anonymous and voluntary, ensuring
that students who did not wish to participate need not have done so. 90
Because of this potential abuse of the invasion-of-rights standard, it is
crucial that the standard be strictly circumscribed.
"Invasion of the rights of others" must refer only to a tortious act,
83. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
84. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 752 (1966). The court approved a total ban on the buttons rather
than direct punishment for disruption because "the reprehensible conduct ••• was so inexorably
tied to the wearing of the buttons that the two are not separable." 363 F.2d at 754.
85. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not compel motorists to display
official state motto on license plates); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 lJ.S. 624
(1943) (state may not compel public school students to salute the flag).
86. The passersby also have a cause of action in tort for the unauthorized contact with their
persons. See w. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 40 (5th ed. 1984); REsTATE·
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 19 (1965).
87. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
88. 563 F.2d at 516. The court accorded great deference to the members of the school board,
looking to see only if they "had demonstrated a substantial basis for their conclusion," 563 F.2d
at 519, rather than balancing the conflicting testimony from both sides' experts. It distinguished
other cases which had held that information about student sexuality was protected, saying that
those cases involved the dissemination, not the compilation, of information. 563 F.2d at 516 n.2.
The dissent reminded the majority that a cover letter attached to the survey assured students
their'answers would be anonymous and that no one had to respond, 563 F.2d at 522, and that the
local daily newspapers regularly published information on the "forbidden topics," 563 F.2d at
521. The dissent also protested the lack of weight accorded plaintiff's experts, and objected that
"a general undifferentiated fear of emotional disturbance . . . strikes me as too nebulous and as
posing too dangerous a potential for unjustifiable destruction of constitutionally protected free
speech rights to support a prior restraint." 563 F.2d at 521. For a discussion of the proper
deference to be accorded the judgment of school officials, see notes 161-75 infra and accompanying text.
89. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
90. Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 515. Many school districts routinely administer a battery of tests
to their pupils with no such safeguards. For a good discussion of the problems presented by
schools' information-gathering and testing, see Comment, Access to Student Records in Wisconsin: A Comparative Analysis of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 and Wis·
consin Statute Section 118.25, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 975, 975-84.
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such as the accosting in Blackwell, or in the context of student publications, to libel or personal abuse. Tort standards define when an act
"invades the rights of another" to such an extent that the person
wronged should recover damages. Limiting school action under the
invasion-of-rights justification to torts or potential torts means that a
school can refer to previously defined legal standards to decide if it
may constitutionally restrain student expression. Moreover, limiting
"invasion of rights" to tortious behavior fulfills the primary function
of this justification for restraint - allowing the school to protect itself
from tort liability for its students' actions. 91
Libel is the most obvious potential tort resulting from the activities
of the student press. For example, in Frasca v. Andrews, 92 the school
newspaper planned to print an anonymous letter to the editor critical
of a student government official. 93 The principal investigated and determined that the article was substantially untrue, but the newspaper
editor stood by the letter while refusing to document its charges. The
principal, fearing possible legal action against the school, confiscated
all copies of the newspaper. 94 The court correctly permitted the
seizure under the invasion-of-rights standard.95
Schools should have a similar right to prevent publication of matter that could result in other forms of tort liability for the school.
While mere personal abuse or vituperative language directed at a specific individual is not tortious, 96 the Second Restatement of Torts considers "conduct intended to cause emotional distress" to be a separate
cause of action. 97 The American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice
Standards Project would permit restriction of student expression that
"advocates racial, religious, or ethnic prejudice or discrimination or
91. See notes 94-95 infra and accompanying text.
92. 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
93. The letter called the student "a total disgrace to the school" and said he maintained a low
academic average, had been suspended from school, and had falsified his grades on the school
computer. 463 F. Supp. at 1046.
94. The principal concluded that "several of [the letter's] statements were false and, in his
opinion, libelous; that its publication would have a devastating impact on [the subject of the
statements], and that there would be no reasonable opportunity to reply," for the issue was to be
distributed on the last day of school. 463 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
95. 463 F. Supp. at 1052. The court followed the Trachtman standard criticized above, see
note 88 supra and accompanying text, but a narrower reading of the invasion-of-rights test still
supports the result. The allegation of grade changing is libelous if untrue, and the school system
would be liable for damages. See note 50 supra.
96. See Crozman v. Callahan, 136 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1955) (no liability where superior officer called airman a "God-damned Stooge" and a "f-king bastard"); Cowan v. Time
Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 198, 245 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1963) (no liability where photo of plaintiff and others
published in national magazine, captioned "Some Idiots Afloat").
97. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46(1) (1965). This tort requires "conduct . . . so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community," provided the conduct actually does cause severe emotional distress to the victim. Id. Comment d.
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seriously disparages particular racial, religious, or ethnic groups. " 98
The Project cautions that to fall under this rule, material must actually
advocate discrimination or seriously disparage particular groups. 99
This limiting language is designed to protect both scholarly works
with controversial theses and the use of emotion-laden terms for dramatic effect. I00 The Project's definition of student expression likely to
cause emotional distress, when coupled with subsequent expert review,
presents another constitutionally permissible standard for prior restraint of student expression.
Publication of truthful information can, in certain circumstances,
also be tortious. Some details of a person's life may not be published
without the person's consent. Unauthorized publication of this information constitutes the publicity or public disclosure of private facts,
one aspect of the tort of invasion of privacy. IOI The Project's guidelines, following the Restatement, permit restriction of expression that
"is violative of another person's right of privacy by publicly exposing
details of such person's life, the exposure of which would be offensive
and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. . . ."I 02 Thus, a student newspaper can be penalized for disclosing intimate details of named students' sex livesI 03 or prevented from
disclosing the contents of school discipline records, I04 As with the
tort of libel or inducing emotional distress, if student expression constitutes an invasion of privacy under the legal standard, a school board
may legitimately restrain its publication.
Even a regulation based on an invasion-of-rights standard may
98. PROJECT, supra note 51, at 84. According to the Project, the greater susceptibility of
youth to negative influences can justify regulation in schools: "It has long been recognized that
moral indoctrination and socialization are valid and important parts of the educative function of
schools." Id. at 86.
99. PROJECT, supra note 51, at 90 (emphasis in original).
100. For examples of works that should be protected, see Baker v. Downey City Bd. of
Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (challenging article entitled "The Student as Nigger,"
comparing the status of students to that of slaves); A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING (1980)
(arguing that I.Q. tests are not biased against English·speaking minorities who typically perform
worse than whites); cf Mikolinski v. Burt Reynolds Production Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 895, 409
N.E.2d 1324 (1980) (dismissing suit by Polish-Americans who claimed they were defamed by
ethnic jokes in a movie).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). For a discussion of the origin
and scope of this doctrine, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 86, at 849-54, 856-63.
102. PROJECT, supra note 51, at 84. Cf Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d
606, 610 (1956) (news dispatch that 12-year-old married woman gave birth to a normal, healthy
child not reasonably calculated to embarrass or humiliate plaintiffs or cause mental distress).
103. In 1977 an alternative campus newspaper at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
published a "Consumer Guide to M.I.T. Men," naming and rating the sexual prowess of 36
students with whom the authors claimed to have had sexual relations. The editor who originated
the idea was suspended from school for three months, and the authors were placed on probation.
See Sex Ratings Set Off M.LT. Furor, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1977, at A18, col. 2; Students Are
Disciplined/or M.LT. Sex Ratings, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1977, at A9, col. 6.
104. See Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (letter charging student had
been suspended from school held an unprotected disclosure).
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pose a constitutional problem if phrased in tort language. One court
has held that the word "libelous" is a term of art and impermissibly
vague when used in a regulation designed for laymen and students,
especially because some forms of libel are constitutionally protected.105 Thus, although tort language may properly define when a
school may constitutionally restrain student expression, the technical
terms do not give enough information to the potential victims of a
restraint - the students. The standard that governs prior restraint of
allegedly obscene material suggests a method to reconcile the need for
standards phrased in tort language with the potential of abuse that
stems from the vagueness of legal terminology: permit limited prior
restraint, but only until an outside, expert opinion can be obtained. 106
This procedural safeguard of review by legal counsel should apply to
any prior restraint by a school board under the invasion-of-rights standard. It would allow school boards to protect themselves from tort
suits, while quick legal review of a decision to restrain would deter and ultimately prevent - unconstitutional abuse of the standard.
Another constitutional protection for the student press is the limit
of school authority. School administrators must remember that the
invasion-of-rights doctrine is designed to allow the school to keep tortious expression out of its publications, not otherwise to limit the first
amendment rights of students. 107 Under this standard, a school can
only restrict student expression where the school would be liable for
the consequences of that expression. An underground newspaper that
receives no money or official recognition from the school does not become the school's responsibility simply because students prepare the
newspaper on school premises 108 or because the newspaper is distrib105. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Bright v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist., 18 Cal. 3d 450, 463-64, 556 P.2d 1090, 1098-99, 134 Cal. Rptr.
639, 647-48 (1976). Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public
official must prove "actual malice" to recover damages for defamation). Criticism of school
board members or high administrators would likely fall under the Sullivan rule, as these officials
are "public figures" in the local community.
106. See note 26 supra. Unlike obscenity, where the challenged work is itself the most material evidence, libel may present many difficult proof problems and is unsuited for summary judicial resolution. Given the need for a swift decision concerning the nature of the alleged libel so as
not to prejudice the student's rights, the best solution is to permit suppression of allegedly
libelous material only until competent, independent legal advice can be obtained. The student
would have the same right to review of this opinion as he would have of an adverse determination
by the school board. See notes 157-75 infra and accompanying text. This approach would protect the student from the decisions of school officials acting beyond their field of expertise and
would also protect the school from liability for damages. It was endorsed in Reineke v. Cobb
County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See also CoLLEGE CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 51, at 15 (if college newspaper not legally independent from the school, school
should only veto an article after "a specific finding of potential libel as determined by an impartial legal authority").
107. See notes 91-106 supra and accompanying text.
108. Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980). The students in Thomas had produced a satire of their school. School officials ordered
them to keep it away from campus, so the students sold the paper at a nearby store, but purchas-
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uted on school grounds. 109 For these unofficial newspapers, the invasion-of-rights ground for prior restraint by the school does not apply;
Tinker permits administrative regulation only under the substantial
disruption standard. 1 10
C. Subversive Incitement, Obscenity, and Vulgarity
The Tinker test is not the only standard for measuring the protection to be accorded student speech. Anything not protected for
adults 111 is not protected for students. While student speech is unlikely to endanger national security, it may be obscene or incite illegal
action. Therefore, school officials have often attempted to apply these
limitations on adult speech to student publications.
The illegal-incitement doctrine permits the punishment only of
"advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or promoting imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 112 Because any
expression meeting this standard would also meet the substantial-disruption test, the illegal-incitement standard is superfluous in the context of the student press. Nevertheless, school boards have tried to use
the illegal-incitement test to go beyond the limits of the substantialdisruption standard. Under the illegal-incitement test, school boards
have attempted to justify, for example, a one-semester suspension for
an editorial urging students to throw away school handouts intended
for their parents 113 or the confiscation of a sex-information supplement aimed at senior high school students. 114 But these examples of
student expression do not meet that portion of the illegal-incitement
ers brought several copies onto school grounds. The court voided the suspensions of the authors,
holding that the newspaper was not connected to the school and that the officials' actions had to
be judged against the adult standards for restraints on speech. 607 F.2d at 1050.
109. The students are not agents of the school, but independent actors using school grounds
as they might use a sidewalk to distribute literature. School officials may therefore discipline
them for disruptive distribution or distribution that violates content-neutral distribution policies,
but may not use content-based standards to judge their expression. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981). Nor can the school be held
liable for any defamation contained in such a newspaper. See, e.g., Milliner v. Turner, 436 So. 2d
1300 (La. App. 1983).
110. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
112. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
113. See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
The school board charged the students with "an immediate advocacy of, and incitement to, disregard of school administrative procedures." 425 F.2d at 12. The court held that no discipline
could be permitted without a showing that disruption was in fact likely to result from the expression. 425 F.2d at 15. See also Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) (invalidating prohibition of material advocating illegal actions when no fear of substantial disruption).
114. See Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), ajfd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d
Cir. 1975). School officials claimed that publication of the supplement would be a "clear and
present danger'' to students. The court disagreed, finding it "ironic that defendants view the
dissemination of knowledge here as presenting a 'danger' which will bring about 'evils.' " 383 F.
Supp. at 1165-66.
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test that requires a likelihood of "imminent lawless action"; restraints
on these types of expression therefore require justification under some
other standard. The illegal-incitement test adds nothing to the proper
criteria for regulation of student expression, but dangerously increases
the potential for regulatory abuse.
The constitutional standard for obscenity exempts from first
amendment protection only "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to
the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 115 Student expression that
meets this standard is not protected from regulation under the first
amendment. But, as with the illegal-incitement standard, school
boards have attempted to use the obscenity standard to justify constitutionally dubious restraints of student expression. For example,
school boards have often equated obscenity and vulgarity, disciplining
students for four-letter words uttered in nonsexual contexts. 116
While Ginsberg v. New York and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation provide a lower standard of protection for expression directed at minors, 117 a realistic appraisal of the sensibilities of high school students
indicates that four-letter words per se are not obscene for high
schoolers. 118 These same vulgarisms can be heard daily on the
115. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Such works would include "[p]atently
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or
simulated," and "[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at 25.
116. See Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 1973) ("earthy
words relating to bodily functions and sexual intercourse" in a letter to the editor in an underground newspaper held not substantially disruptive and not restrainable), vacated as moot, 420
U.S. 128 (1975); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 n.7 (7th Cir. 1972) ("profanity and vulgarisms" in underground newspaper not restrainable); Reineke v. Cobb County
School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (one appearance of the word "damn" in
official student newspaper not disruptive); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) ("four Jetter words" in student literary annual not obscene for high school students, nor
disruptive). But see Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.) (vulgarityriddled Jetter in underground newspaper, captioned "High Skool Is F . . . ed," justifies discipline
when distributor made no effort to comply with school prior-submission rules and shouted profanity at school officials), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ.,
307 F. Supp. 517, 523-25 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ("multiple vulgarisms," including one use of "bullshit" in advertisement in underground newspaper, justify discipline under state education code).
CJ Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), which held that "such expression must be, in some
significant way, erotic," 403 U.S. at 20, and overturned the breach-of-the-peace conviction of a
man who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse. The jacket was
plainly visible to children present in the courthouse. 403 U.S. at 16.
In Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985), the school board
suspended a student for three days after he nominated a candidate for student government office.
His speech was laden with sexual innuendo, but contained no offensive words. A divided Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's injunction against discipline, fearing that any regulation
based on such an amorphous standard of "indecency" would give school officials excessive discretion in regulating the content of student expression. 755 F.2d at 1363.
117. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
118. "Realistically, high school students are beyond the point of being sheltered from the
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streets 119 and can be found on the shelves of the high school library.1 20
Any seventeen-year-old - the age of a typical high school junior or
senior - may attend R-rated movies containing virtually every form
of spoken vulgarity without parental consent. Concern for adolescent
sensibilities does not warrant restricting expression freely available to
students in other contexts, especially where the restriction would keep
students from reading their own words. 121 Under Tinker, the school is
free to restrict any expression, without recourse to obscenity law, that
is likely to cause substantial disruption or invade the rights of others.
Any further extension of the obscenity standard threatens to chill student expression properly protected by the first amendment.1 22

D.

Other Content-Based Justifications

While the three categories above encompass the majority of challenges to student speech, several other categories merit discussion. In
Williams v. Spencer, 123 the Fourth Circuit upheld the confiscation of
an underground student newspaper containing an advertisement for
drug paraphernalia, as violating a regulation against material that
"[e]ncourages actions which endanger the health or safety of students."124 The court said that the regulation was not void for vagueness, because it was impractical to define each of "the infinite variety
of materials that might be found to encourage actions which endanger
the health or safety of students," and because "a reasonably intelligent
high school student would . . . know" that an advertisement for drug
paraphernalia violated the rule. 12s
This decision appears inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's earlier
holdings that the terms "substantial disruption," "libel," and "obscenity," taken from the relevant Supreme Court standards, were imperpotpourri of sights and sounds we encounter at every turn in our daily lives." Fraser v. Bethel
School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985).
119. See Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Baker v. Downey
City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (upholding discipline under state rule
requiring students to "refrain entirely from the use of profane and vulgar language") (emphasis in
opinion).
120. See Sullivan v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1165-66 (1969) (citing
five books and two magazines found on shelves in the school system's libraries which contained
the challenged vulgarism), vacated, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973).
121. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), expressly authorizes states to prohibit the
sale of soft-core pornography to those of high school age, but Ginsberg involves pictorial, not
written, expression. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973), implies that verbal expression enjoys a greater degree of protection than does pictorial expression, a distinction which
should limit Ginsberg to vulgar pictures.
122. Occasional profanity is not disruptive per se for high school students, but if used in a
disruptive manner the language can be regulated.
123. 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980).
124. 622 F.2d at 1205.
125. 622 F.2d at 1205.
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missibly vague. 126 While the school board is within its rights to ban
advertisements for marijuana pipes and cocaine-related paraphernalia, 127 the literal application of a standard that allows suppression of
expression that may "endanger the health or safety of students" would
also outlaw cigarette advertising, thus permitting the confiscation of
almost every national periodical. Such a standard lends itself too readily to capricious application. In contrast to tort standards, which are
inherently vague when addressed to high school students and thus
should be coupled with subsequent review to ensure proper application
of the legal standard, 128 standards that do not depend on legal or technical usage can be more explicitly defined. The school board must
give the "reasonably intelligent high school student" more explicit
guidance as to the grounds for regulation.
Other school districts have tried to suppress student-sponsored discussions of sexuality. 129 In the absence of any clear-cut rationale for
such censorship, the schools have contended that the dissemination of
information about sex would create substantial disruption, 130 invade
the rights of others, 131 or intrude into the curriculum. 132 None of
these claims distinguishes the discussion of sexuality from the "discussion" of the Vietnam War permitted in Tinker, 133 and all should be
rejected. However a school chooses to discuss - or ignore - sexual
issues in its curriculum, it cannot assert that all outside discussion of
sexual topics is disruptive or violative of others' rights.
A different form of content-based regulation addresses the form
rather than the substance of student expression. Almost all high
schools appoint a faculty advisor to oversee the student newspaper and
exert some influence over its content. The advisor adds to the educa126. See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478
F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
127. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
128. See text following note 90 supra.
129. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (survey of students' sexual attitudes and activities), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist.,
462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (birth-control information in underground newspaper); Gambino v.
Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.) (birth-control information in official
high school newspaper), affd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (student newspaper supplement containing information about contraception
and abortion), affd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Opinion letter R81-065 Arizona Attorney General (May 8, 1981) (advising school it could not block an advertisement for contraceptives in the student newspaper).
130. Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972); Bayer v.
Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd. mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
131. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925
(1978).
132. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
133. For example, under the rationale of Trachtman, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), which
upheld the suppression of a student sexuality survey, an article criticizing American soldiers'
presence in Vietnam could be banned as likely to cause severe emotional harm to students whose
relatives were fighting or had been killed in the war. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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tional experience of working on a school paper by editing grammar,
spelling, and style; suggesting a format; and often commenting on the
suitability of a particular article. 134 A few school boards have attempted to impose a similar control on underground newspapers. One
district enacted a regulation requiring all unsanctioned newspapers to
"conform to the journalistic standards of accuracy, taste, and decency
maintained by the newspapers of general circulation in Arlington." 13 5
It was summarily voided as a standardless "monument to vagueness." 136 Thus, it seems clear that "expression by high school students
cannot be prohibited solely because other students, teachers, administrators, or parents may disagree with its content." 137 Nor can officials
prohibit or restrict expression solely because they believe it inaccurate
or ungrammatical; 138 neither flaw supports a forecast of substantial
disruption 139 or any of the other justifications for suppression. 140
Other schools have barred distribution of commercial literature or
prevented the sale, or distribution for donation, of newspapers on campus.141 These regulations, which have been defended as necessary to
prevent the schoolyard from becoming a commercial marketplace, are
overbroad. They prevent reader-supported publications from taking
root without any showing that such publications are disruptive.142
The school can effect its legitimate end - preventing students from
being deluged with commercial material - through regulations restricting not content, but the time, place, and manner of distribution
on campus. It must therefore use this less restrictive alternative.
134. The advisor should remember that he is in fact the first line of censorship. He is free to
criticize an article or a topic as unsuitable for the paper, but except for the circumstances that
permit administrative restraint, all final decisions pertaining to the content of the paper should be
made by the student editorial staff. With a "curricular newspaper" the advisor has more control
over content. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text. The presence of an advisor should
also eliminate any additional administrative review over the paper unless the advisor contends
that a given article should be suppressed.
135. Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 747 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1977).
136. Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 748 (E.D. Va. 1977).
137. Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972). School
sponsorship of a newspaper established as a forum for student opinion does not offer any basis for
additional authority over the content of the newspaper: "The Constitution forbids a State to
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required
to create the forum in the first place." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
138. Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (citing
Schiffv. Williams, 529 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975)).
139. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972); Reineke v.
Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
140. See, e.g., text at note 49-51 supra.
141. See Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot,
420 U.S. 128 (1975); Hernandez v. Hanson, 430 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Neb. 1977); Peterson v. Board
of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Neb. 1973). Commercial speech is protected by the first amendment, though it is not accorded the same protection as other speech. See Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
142. Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot,
420 U.S. 128 (1975); Peterson v. Board of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 1208, 1214 (D. Neb. 1973).
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A final form of content-based regulation concerns anonymity.
School officials have claimed that unless the authors of all material
distributed in the schools are known to them, the school will be unable
to discipline those responsible for libelous or obscene material. 143 But
such a regulation is so broad that the "chilling effect" it would have on
free speech far outweighs its benefits. Students would be deterred
from any criticism of school officials if they knew that they had to
reveal their names to those same offi.cials. 144 The identity of a student
who brings libelous or obscene matter to campus can be discovered
through the ordinary disciplinary procedures, in the same way the
school identifies students who bring drugs to campus, without encouraging students with legitimate grievances to remain silent for fear of
administrative reprisals.
E. Restrictions on Distribution

Another form of regulation addresses the manner of distribution,
not its content. Reasonable rules governing the time, place, and manner of on-campus distribution of literature support the legitimate interest of school officials in maintaining order 145 and should be
permitted. 146 However, the burden should still rest on the school to
justify such regulations. 147 Because time, place, and manner rules permit only subsequent punishment for violators, they are constitutionally preferable to rules requiring prior submission; 148 indeed, a court
which barred prior submission entirely specifically authorized time,
place, and manner rules. 149 Non-content-based regulation presents
clear-cut issues and can be easily handled: reasonable time, place, and
143. See Jacobs v. Board of School Commrs., 490 F.2d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as
moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
144. Jacobs, 490 F.2d at 607. Cf Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (invalidating
a city ordinance requiring the identification of all pamphleteers, noting the "important role in the
progress of mankind" played by anonymous authors such as the creators of the Federalist
Papers).
145. The first amendment does not grant speakers an absolute right to say what they want,
when they want. Governments may impose restrictions on speech in the interest of preserving
order, so long as those regulations are narrowly drawn and are not based on the content of the
speech to be regulated. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640 (1981); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Peterson v. Board
of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Neb. 1973).
146. Three circuits have explicitly authorized time, place, and manner rules in schools. See
Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 149 (1st
Cir. 1971).
147. Shanley v. Northeast lndep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 (5th Cir. 1972); see also
Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972).
148. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460
F.2d 1355, 1357 (7th Cir. 1972); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 149 (1st Cir. 1971).
149. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1357, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972).
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manner regulations are valid so long as they are narrowly drafted to
achieve the school's legitimate end of maintaining order.
To summarize, the Constitution does not protect all forms of expression. School officials may restrain or halt distribution of any material that the officials have reasonable cause to believe will: (1)
produce a substantial physical disruption of the orderly operation of
the school (including incitement to illegal actions); 150 (2) constitute a
tortious invasion of the rights of others, whether by content or by
manner of distribution; 151 or (3) satisfy the legal definition of obscenity.152 These definitions should be strictly construed to avoid infringement of students' first amendment rights. All other student expression
should receive the same protection as adult expression, yet, like adult
expression, still be subject to reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on the time, place, and manner of its distribution. 153 To ensure
that student speech is adequately protected, school regulations should
be subject to judicial review especially tailored to the school setting.
V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATIONS REsTRICTING SPEECH

Restraints of student speech must be viewed against the backdrop
of the hard line the Supreme Court has taken against prior restraints
on speech promulgated by administrative agencies. On five occasions
the Court has insisted that "any restraint prior to judicial review can
be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the purpose of
preserving the status quo," 154 that is, "for the shortest fixed period
compatible with sound judicial resolution." 155 The burden of instituting legal proceedings and proving the unprotected nature of the material must rest with the agency. 156 Because a system of prior
submission of student publications to a school official risks becoming a
forbidden censorship system, it appears to warrant the same safeguards mandated by the Supreme Court in other contexts.
150. See notes 62-80 supra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 81-110 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 115-22 supra and accompanying text.
153. See notes 145-49 supra and accompanying text.
154. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975); see also New York Times
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); B.antam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). The Court has also
struck down a number of restraints imposed with judicial approval. See Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (injunction against habitual use of premises for exhibition
of obscene material); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (injunction against
publication of details of a murder trial until after jury impaneled); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (injunction against distribution ofliterature charging realestate broker with frightening whites from an area); Carroll v. President & Commrs. of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (injunction against white-supremacist rally); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 700 (1931) (injunction against publication of a "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" newspaper).
155. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
156. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975).
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Lower courts have uniformly upheld the right of students to a
prompt and appealable decision, 157 one which relies on clearly defined
procedures and substantive criteria. 158 But while they have been willing to grant students the right to appeal through the school system,
the courts have been unwilling to mandate judicial review of school
board decisions. In the leading case, Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, the Second Circuit declared:
[I]t would be highly disruptive to the educational process if a secondary
school principal were required to take a school newspaper editor to court
every time the principal reasonably anticipated disruption and sought to
restrain its cause. Thus, we will not require school officials to seek a
judicial decree before they may enforce the Board's policy.159

The Eisner court's argument is not entirely persuasive. While the
special situation of the school can justify some restraints on otherwise
protected speech, 160 the school's interest in an orderly learning environment is not compelling enough to justify prior restraint of student
expression with no review by a disinterested body.
Such review is necessary for several reasons. Most obviously, the
officials who will be reviewing student expression are likely also to be
the targets of that expression, making objective evaluation difficult.
Furthermore, school officials have no special grounding in the constitutional questions or legal definitions relevant to a restraint decision,
making it inappropriate for them to render ultimate decisions on matters of free speech. Eisner reflects much more confidence in the judgment of school officials than the facts warrant: 161 among cases that
reached the federal courts, students prevailed in three out of every
four challenges to regulations or disciplinary actions. 162 Other student
challengers were doubtless dissuaded by the time and expense necessary to bring a case to court.163
Yet the Eisner court correctly suggests that the school setting is
different from settings frequently dealt with by the Supreme Court.
157. See, e.g.. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1973); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d
803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
158. See, e.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 811 (2d Cir. 1971) (proscription against "distributing" written or printed materiai without prior consent held unconstitutionally vague); accord Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1349 (4th Cir. 1973) ("libelous"
and "obscene" imprecise); see also Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) ("substantial disruption" imprecise).
159. 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
160. See notes 62-110 supra and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g.. notes 54, 129, 135, 141 supra and accompanying text.
162. Twenty-six out of thirty-four regulations or disciplinary measures were invalidated.
163. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (striking a statute requiring prior
approval of motion pictures as Jacking adequate procedural safeguards. The Court held: "Without these safeguards, it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor's determination. . . . The . . . stake . . . may be insufficient to warrant a protracted and onerous course of
litigation.").
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The Court has required putative censors to obtain judicial review
before suppressing books deemed unfit for minors, 164 or movies or
stage productions considered obscene. 165 In both instances the state
interest is the same: to protect the community, or a part of it, from
unsuitable material. This interest also exists in the school setting, but
other interests are unique to the schools. Schools are charged with
maintaining order and are concerned with protecting themselves from
tort liability. 166 These interests might lead the school to prefer no official student press to an uncontrollable student press or to one that
could only be controlled through a cumbersome judicial mechanism.167 A certain degree of review is provided by the appeals process
within the educational system, a protection not always found in the
procedures limiting adult speech condemned by the Supreme Court. 168
The best solution, taking into account both the presumption of unconstitutionality attached to all forms of press censorship and the special circumstances of the academic setting, is an intermediate level of
judicial involvement. In contrast to the adult context, a school should
not need to seek judicial approval before enforcing its regulations, but
the student faced with a restraint should have the right to tum to the
courts for review of the decision. 169 If the student does so, the school
should then have the burden of justifying its regulations. 170 The Fifth
Circuit explained why the burden is properly placed on the school:
We see no reason to toy with Tinker's placement of that burden on the
164. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
165. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965); cf Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (requiring the government to initiate
judicial review before censoring unsolicited obscene mail).
166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See notes
49-50 supra and accompanying text.
167. There is no requirement that a school fund a student newspaper, but any restrictions on
distribution of underground newspapers must conform to constitutional standards. See notes 7480, 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
168. Compare Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1977) (review of principal's decision first by the Administrator of Student Affairs, then by the Chancellor, and finally by
the Secretary of the Board of Education), with Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
548 (1975) (directors of a municipal theater decided, without further review, what was "in the
best interest of the community"), and Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (no
review).
169. The student could maintain an action against school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982) for their deprivation of his civil rights under color oflaw. See, e.g., Zucker v. Panitz, 299
F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
170. This is essentially the approach adopted by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School
Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 n.11 (4th Cir.
1971) (a public school need not seek judicial review before disciplining students for violating
prior-submission rules or suppressing material which violates the rules). But see Trachtman v.
Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[A] Federal court ought not impose its own views in
such matters where there is a rational basis for the decisions and actions of the school authorities" - once the school board has presented enough evidence to justify its decision, contradictory testimony of student's experts is irrelevant.).
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school board . . . first, since it is the school board that asserts the right
to curtail presumptively protected activity, the board should bear the
burden of establishing why; and second, the school board presumably
has the essential information that led it to conclude that the activity had
to be curtailed. 171
This proposed procedure for review provides the best balance between a school's interest in efficient, orderly operation and the student's first amendment rights. A school system may be less likely to
abuse its power and more reluctant to challenge student expression in
marginal cases if it knows it will face the task of justifying its regulation before a court than if it thinks its decision will be final. When it
does seek to restrain an article, the school may be more forthright and
conciliatory toward the student whose expression is affected, in an effort to convince the student of the correctness of the decision and
thereby avert a time-consuming and expensive court battle. This proposed procedure will also encourage out-of-court agreements between
administration and student, promoting the laudable sentiment of Eis=ner that "decisions with respect to the operation of local schools be
made by local officials." 112
Even with a system that allows prior restraint, if a student chooses
to challenge a restraint, the path of litigation would not be significantly more onerous than in the adult context. First, any restraint
challenged in court would be limited, as in the adult setting, to "the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution,'' 173 a
period which remains the same whichever party must appeal to the
courts. Furthermore, the "protracted and onerous course of litigation"174 feared by the Supreme Court if an individual is forced to bring
suit to vindicate her first amendment rights should not deter a student,
since she knows that she can make out a prima facie case by showing
the existence of a restraint. 175 Finally, the student incurs the same
costs in defending her rights as if the burden of appeal were on the
school; in either situation she must hire legal counsel. The balance of
burdens in proceeding with a suit thus discourages both parties from
engaging in frivolous litigation.
The fact that a school board lacks a published review policy should
not prohibit it from restraining student speech in the proper circum171. Shanley v. Northeastern Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972).
172. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
173. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
174. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
175. Any prior-submission regulation should clearly and explicitly inform the student of her
right to appeal to the courts and the presumption in favor of permitting publication. Otherwise
the school could create an illusion of finality by remaining silent about the appeals process, a
finality which would indeed have a chilling effect.
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stances. 176 The power to regulate is derived from the power to preserve order, an authority which does not depend on the language of
the regulations. Schools should not be encouraged to establish burdensome, constitutionally suspect review procedures merely on the
chance that one of their students might write something disruptive or
libelous; 177 rather, the school's actions should be evaluated in light of
the constitutional standard even if there is no written policy to guide
the court. But because the absence of written standards increases the
risk of post hoc rationalizations, courts should scrutinize the actions of
school officials especially carefully in such cases. 11s
Many student prior-submission rules are litigated only when a student is disciplined for violating them. As a practical matter, students
- and their parents - are more concerned about a suspension than
about the suppression. If the rule is valid, then so is the punishment
for violating it, 179 so long as due process is followed. But some courts
have upheld discipline against violators without examining the validity
of the underlying rule; 180 these cases pose serious constitutional
problems.
Most of the cases upholding discipline rely on the questionable
premise that however invalid the restraint, the student commits an independent breach of the regulations by relying on self-help. "[T]he
student has a legal way to test the validity of a school regulation and
there is accordingly no reason for him to disregard the school regulation or to flaunt [sic] school discipline." 181 The only permissible way
to challenge a prior-submission rule, according to these courts, is to
request permission to distribute, have it denied, and then appeal
through the school system before turning to the courts - even if the
student has a right to judicial review of the restraint in any case, remains accountable for his deed, and may be punished if he is found to
176. See Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (school authorities justified
in seizing disruptive and libelous material despite having no written policies for review).
177. "Indeed, it is arguable that, as a practical matter, expression is more likely to be inhibited than encouraged if courts were to require schools to adopt regulations limiting speech."
Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979).
178. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
· 179. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (violation of time, place,
and manner rules) (dictum); Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (distribution of
literature adjudged substantially disruptive).
180. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973);
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 n.11 (4th Cir. 1971) (dictum); Graham v. Houston lndep.
School Dist., 335 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238
(E.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 384 n.5 (4th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J.,
sitting by designation); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1973); Hatter v. Los Angeles
City High School Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d
10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Cintron v. State Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp.
674, 681 (D.P.R. 1974).
181. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 n.11 (1971). See also Graham v. Houston lndep.
School Dist., 335 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238,
(E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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have violated a valid rule. This interpretation permits schools to erect
a formidable wall of administrative obstacles to overcome before a student can receive any independent review - in effect, a complete censorship for the duration of the prescribed procedures, no matter how
unreasonable or unconstitutional they might be. This practical "chilling effect" indicates that discipline should be permitted only when the
challenge to the rule involves independently unprotected conduct, 182
or when the rule is upheld as applied to the student's conduct. Substantive review of the regulation is needed to prevent school discipline
for student expression from becoming a roundabout way to punish
students for exercising their first amendment rights without exhausting administrative procedures.
In short, regulations and restraints on the student press must give
the student an opportunity for judicial review of the regulation. While
the burden of filing suit is on the student, the school bears the burden
of justifying its regulation. Any restrictions on student expression not
based on a written policy are subject to closer scrutiny, but the constitutional preference against any form of prior submission renders such
restrictions palatable. School officials may discipline students for violating valid prior-submission rules, but may not impose sanctions on
students for violating invalid rules or for any form of off-campus
expression.
CONCLUSION

High school students do not enjoy the same first amendment protections as adults. However, the differences in protection may only be
justified by the special circumstances of the school setting. The need
to maintain order allows school' authorities to restrain material that
disrupts the school. Concern for its own liability allows the school to
restrain material that tortiously invades the rights of others so long as
the school would be liable for the content of that material. Any expression not protected for adults is not protected for minors. Schools
may also minimize disruption through reasonable, content-neutral regulations governing the time, place, and manner of distribution.
Any regulation governing the prior submission of student material
to school officials must clearly and precisely set out the criteria for
182. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). In
Sullivan, a student who had been suspended for disobeying an order to stop distributing an underground newspaper visited campus several times during his suspension and repeatedly shouted
profanity at the principal. By contrast, in Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973), the
Ninth Circuit voided the suspension of a student for actions likely to cause substantial disruption
because his actions did not violate any school rule, and in Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970), the Seventh Circuit invalidated a suspension based
solely on distribution of an underground newspaper on school premises in violation of the
school's prior-submission rule, where the rule was overbroad and the newspaper was protected
expression.
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restraint and should inform the student of his right to seek judicial
review of any restrictions, a review in which the burden will be on the
school to justify its restrictions. Given the constitutional bias against
such restraints, the courts must strictly construe the regulations. The
school system may not use its disciplinary authority to inhibit the protected expression of students: it may not punish students for failing to
challenge the rules in the prescribed manner, unless their disobedience
is independently disruptive, and it may not discipline students for any
off-campus expression.

